parties, eschewed the designations -denoting national preference -of 'unionist' and 'nationalist' 4 in favour of the third option offered by the Agreement: 'other'.
This article assesses the party's arguments that the power-sharing arrangements are philosophically objectionable, practically ineffective, and politically detrimental to 'other' parties. It argues that the party's condemnation of the Agreement, while commensurate with Alliance's ideological outlook, is overstated. In fact, the party has been able to play pivotal roles, in particular, sustaining a valuable and distinctive critique of post-Agreement politics and society in a similar manner to an opposition party in a 'normal', non-consociational arrangement. Within the voluminous literature on the Northern Ireland conflict, there is still a paucity of research on the Alliance Party, 5 though the party has been subject to comparative examinations with moderate parties in other conflict zones including Israel and South Africa, 6 and Bosnia. 7 The ensuing analysis is based on party documents located in the Northern "careful case analysis -or even single-institution analysis -is required". 8 Nevertheless, the article proposes that the Alliance Party's perspective does underscore the general insufficiency of an elite-level accommodation in resolving violent inter-communal conflict: if consociationalism has the potential to be transformational, it must be conducted by accommodating leaders and accompanied by a clear strategy for improving inter-group relations at all levels. Founded amidst the political turmoil at the outset of 'the Troubles', the party's launch document asserted that there was an urgent need for a party whose "primary objective is to heal the bitter divisions in our community". 10 Alliance has based its reconciliatory politics on a number of claims regarding identity in Northern Ireland. First, the party stresses that many people in Northern Ireland identify with neither unionism nor nationalism, constituting a moderate and non-aligned "third tradition". 11 Second, echoing the constructivist critique of consociationalism's supposed "primordial pessimism", 12 Alliance has a particular view of the nature of group identity itself:
The Alliance Party and the Northern Ireland conflict
We acknowledge that people identify with and belong to religious, ethnic, cultural and regional communities. These however are not permanent or stable, but are open and fluid. People ... can belong to many groups, have a complex identity, and have loyalties to different structures and levels of government. 13 Third, Alliance argues that unionism and nationalism are inherently destabilising. Shared institutions of government require a shared identity and allegiance to function, and so political stability requires the diminution and transcendence of unionism and nationalism:
"As long as we cling to two mutually exclusive "identities", our conflict is likely to rumble on".
14 As a non-nationalist party in a region subject to historic and violent nationalist contestation, Alliance has, inevitably, struggled to convey and convince that its non-aligned identity is genuine and coherent. It has been accused of being both 'really' a unionist party and, less often, 'really' a nationalist party. The perception of the former is due mainly to the party's explicit position that Northern Ireland should remain in the UK as long as a majority wish -what is known as the principle of consent -and the fact that a majority of its voters tend to be Protestant. 15 However, Alliance continues to insist that it is neither unionist nor nationalist. Alliance candidate Duncan Morrow points out that many Protestants in Alliance are there because they are self-consciously not unionist and fixated on the national issue:
'We are what seems to be impossible for people to even accept: utterly and absolutely pragmatic about the [Irish] border. It is not a metaphysical issue for us, it is an issue of how do we best organize this community so that we can best live together.'
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Critique of consociationalism in the Agreement
Throughout 'the Troubles' Alliance consistently supported the establishment of crosscommunity power-sharing but it opposed any version of such that would privilege or potentially entrench existing ethno-national identities. 17 As the party feared and predicted, the 1998 Agreement appeared to do precisely that. Most inimical to Alliance's politics was the requirement of Assembly members to designate themselves 'unionist', 'nationalist' or 'other'. 18 The party believed that embedding group labels into the highest level of government offended its liberal values and threatened the emergence of a shared identity that transcended nationality. In 2017, the party was still referring to designations as "institutional sectarianism". 19 Furthermore, the purpose of designations was to facilitate cross-community voting arrangements which Alliance argued were unfair. Certain key decisions in the Assembly require:
(i) either parallel consent, i.e. a majority of those members present and voting, including a majority of the unionist and nationalist designations present and voting;
(ii) or a weighted majority (60%) of members present and voting, including at least 40% of each of the nationalist and unionist designations present and voting. 20 Alliance argued that such mechanisms meant that the votes of parties designated 'others' counted less than those of 'unionists' and 'nationalists'. This relative powerlessness, the party claimed, could de-incentivize voters from supporting non-unionist/nationalist-designated parties.
Alliance also believed that the Agreement's inclusive 'grand coalition' -another classic consociational idea -in which all parties eligible under the d'Hondt formula could enter the Executive may lead to fragmented, uncoordinated government. Alliance would have preferred the Executive to be formed by parties who could agree a common platform and attain a weighted majority of Assembly representatives. 21 Overall, in tune with several academic critics, Alliance judged that the Agreement's version of power-sharing was insufficiently 'integrationist': lacking incentives to moderation that could encourage centripetal rather than centrifugal dynamics. 22 Nevertheless, Alliance supported the Agreement in full in the belief that the deal had the potential to be a transitional mechanism, a means to the end of Alliance's vision of a liberal, group-blind democracy. In an internal party discussion document dated August 1997,
Stephen Farry encouraged the party to regard any structures which privileged group rights that emerged from the negotiations as temporary "affirmative action" and an "honourable compromise". 23 The party's aim was to catalyze the transition through its own political growth in the post-Agreement dispensation. Thus, although Alliance was highly critical of consociational aspects of the Agreement which it thought illiberal, a rationale of consociationalism as a transitional measure with transformational potential has been articulated by consociationalism's supporters in very similar terms to the Alliance Party. November, David Ford, the new Alliance leader, said that the situation in which the party found itself "stank" but "some of us are reluctantly prepared to hold our noses for a week".
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But subsequent survey evidence showed that a majority of party members opposed redesignation, 28 while two Alliance MLAs refused to do so at the time.
The party portrayed this episode as proof of the flaws in the Agreement and vindication of its policy preference for weighted majority voting. 29 But the voting system remained, and the episode highlighted the vulnerability of both the Agreement and the position of the Alliance Party. Indeed, some observers saw the re-designation affair as an indicator of the increasing decline of the party, notwithstanding Alliance's promise that it would not be repeated. 30 The course of political events meant that Alliance did not face serious pressure to redesignate again. The Assembly was suspended in October 2002 and, on its return in 2007, contained a secure pro-power-sharing majority on both sides. Suspension, which was due to alleged spying by Sinn Féin, meant Alliance could portray its policy of voluntary coalition as not only now ideologically preferable to a grand coalition, but also offering a path out of the deadlock. Alliance also contended that communal designations were responsible for the polarization within unionism and nationalism and the concomitant impasse. After the
November 2003 elections in which the hardline Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) and Sinn
Féin made significant gains, Farry wrote that the "swing to the extremes" was entirely predictable:
The principle cause of this result is the institutionalized sectarianism within the Agreement. Rather than trying to create a new political culture in which all parties seek to work in the common interest, the Agreement has entrenched a system of intraethnic competition within two separate Unionist and Nationalist polities. 31 Whether or not the election result was due to "institutionalized sectarianism within the Agreement" -and it is doubtful, as we now explore -the squeeze on the centre ground in this period was evident. Alliance's vote share fell from 6. Alliance's claim that the voting system, which requires communal designations, is not only distasteful, but unfair, is supported by Rick Wilford, who calls it "patently undemocratic" that 'other' votes count less: Alliance is "a casualty of this anomalous and wholly unnecessary procedure [designation and parallel consent]". 33 To investigate Alliance's complaint, Alex Schwartz runs a series of voting simulations. He finds that there is some merit in the party's grievance but that, assuming parties vote en bloc, the voting rules are unfair to all smaller parties, not simply 'other' parties, since any smaller party's votes may not be required to meet the unionist and nationalist thresholds. Schwarz also argues that this unfairness is balanced to some degree by the 'super-legitimacy' provided by parallel consent rules, an important mechanism given the deficit of legitimacy that characterized government in Northern Ireland in the past.
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It should also be noted that there is no evidence that designations have dissuaded voters from opting for 'others' as Alliance has speculated. It is unclear how much voters are even aware of designations, while voting that reflects the community divide has persisted for generations in Northern Ireland regardless of prevailing political arrangements. 35 Indeed, as Cera Murtagh finds, Alliance representatives themselves appear to be more exercised by the symbolic meaning of communal designations and their associated rules, rather than any substantive harmful effects on Alliance's electoral performance. 36 Also refuted by supporters of consociationalism has been the accusation, leveled by Alliance and many others, that inclusive coalition, plus rules such as parallel consent and the 'petition of concern' (a mechanism that can be triggered by thirty Assembly members forcing a decision to require parallel consent), produce ineffective, gridlocked, and unaccountable government. Christopher McCrudden et al caution against weighted majority voting due to the impossibility of determining the right threshold. Moreover, they argue that the d'Hondt method of appointing an Executive provides an "automatic, elegant, transparent and democratic" means of forming a government, avoiding exclusion and protracted negotiations. 37 Those authors furthermore reject charges that the Assembly has been unproductive in making laws and lacking in accountability. 38 A significant amount of legislation has been passed and mutual vetoes have not led to gridlock. An opposition can be formed at any time since parties are free not to sit in the Executive if they so wish; indeed, the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) and UUP's decision to form an opposition in 2016 was arguably a demonstration of consociationalists' hope for a gradual, 'natural' dissolution of consociational structures.
'Other' opportunities
In sum, Alliance's criticisms regarding the illiberal, dysfunctional and polarising nature of post-Agreement politics are over-stated. In fact, not only is it unlikely that the Alliance Party's modest electoral performance has been the fault of the power-sharing architecture, the party has been able to play a number of pivotal roles which have aided political progress and furthered its political agenda.
Perhaps most significantly, Alliance took charge of the Justice Ministry in 2010 after policing and justice powers were finally devolved from Westminster to the Assembly. Due to the role that the perceived partiality of the police and judiciary had played in the conflict, and the role in violence of members of Sinn Féin, neither of the two main parties trusted the other to assume the sensitive role of Justice Minister. An Alliance member was deemed acceptable by both -or at least less undesirable than a member of the opposing party -and given that the institutions would have collapsed otherwise, to that extent, Alliance became the very fulcrum of power-sharing. 39 One of the conditions of Alliance taking that role was progress on the so-called 'shared future' agenda, a government plan to tackle social segregation and promote reconciliation (a draft of which was in fact produced for consultation in July 2010). On this matter, Alliance exerted considerable influence throughout the post-Agreement period, crafting a distinctive and powerful discourse calling for a more integrated society and attempting to hold the largest parties to account regarding progress towards that goal -or lack thereof. In January 2013, in the ongoing absence of a viable, adopted Executive strategy, Alliance published its own shared future proposals, For Everyone, which it said could be a "blueprint" for an Executive strategy. 40 The One is the fact that implementing the Agreement after 1998 required extremely challenging issues to be worked through, in particular, grievances related to the legacy of violence, and cultural contestation. These kept oppositional group identities salient. While
Alliance opposed the determined inclusivity of the Agreement, it was this feature that helped to facilitate the moderation and accommodation of the DUP and Sinn Féin. The other, related, explanation is simply that not that many people in Northern Ireland understand identity and politics in the manner of Alliance, or at least not with sufficient conviction to vote for it.
Britishness and Irishness, and their attendant political aspirations, remain dominant.
Nevertheless, the 'other' party impacted the new politics at key junctures and, in keeping with its founding purpose to "heal division", Alliance has provided a unique critical voice highlighting the larger parties' failure to recognize and address sectarianism. Alliance has done so in a period when the political agenda has been focussed squarely on buying in the 'extremes' and on establishing and maintaining an elite-level accommodation. The party's key contribution has been to impress upon the parties and the public that, regardless of consociationalism's necessity, such an elite-level accommodation is not sufficient for sustainable peace. For power-sharing to be genuinely transformative, attitudes and structures that engender trust, interdependence, and reconciliation must be deliberately and strategically promoted at all levels of society.
